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TORTS
by
Reba Graham Rasor*
N THE always-lively field of tort law more than a hundred new cases
were decided by Texas appellate courts during the period reviewed.
Some old doctrines were carefully reinforced, while others, after determined
assault, were left in an uncertain condition. For example, the future of
charitable immunity in Texas is now surrounded by question marks. Determination of what is "open and obvious" in the "no duty" and volenti
cases is apparently being very strictly construed. And the supreme court has
officially recognized what every parent knows-that it is not possible to
make a place "childproof."
I.

INTENTIONAL

INJURY

A jury finding that the defendant committed an assault and batteryprovided the jury was given a legal definition of assault and battery in conjunction with the question-is more than a finding that the defendant hit
or attacked the plaintiff. The case involved an elderly Chinese vegetable
peddler who was thrown off a produce company's premises by the company president.' The jury was asked if the defendant had committed an
assault and battery and was told that such would not be the case if the
defendant had used no more force than necessary for the defense of property. The supreme court held that the jury's affirmative finding on this
issue could only mean that the defendant had committed an assault and
battery without legal justification.
II.

NEGLIGENT INJURY

No Duty-Volenti. The decisions of the past year further developed the
novel Texas doctrine of assumed risk. Two cases seem to indicate a tendency of the supreme court to be sparing in the use of the concepts of "no
duty" and volenti.
"No duty" is the tag given to assumed risk in Texas in situations where
the plaintiff is injured on the defendant's land. Briefly, the doctrine is this:
the occupier of land owes his invitees a duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition or to warn them of dangers. But the occupier owes
"no duty" if (1) the invitee knows about the condition and appreciates
B.J., University of Texas; LL.B., Southern Methodist University. Assistant Professor of Law,
Southern Methodist University.
' Pon Lip Chew v. Gilliland, 398 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. 1965).
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the danger or (2) the dangerous condition is so open and obvious that the
invitee will be charged in law with knowledge and appreciation of the
danger. With respect to this doctrine, the burden is on the plaintiff to show
that the defendent owed him a duty.' Volentia on the other hand, is an
affirmative defense. It is applicable to injuries on the defendant's land and
to other assumed risk situations. Volenti applies when the plaintiff either
had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition or, because the condition
was so patent, he is charged in law with knowledge. In addition, it requires
a finding that the plaintiff, with this knowledge, nevertheless proceeded.'
Under each of these doctrines the critical question usually is whether the
plaintiff had knowledge and appreciation of the danger, either actually or
as a matter of law. In previous cases the court has considered, among other
things, whether the plaintiff had previously encountered the condition.'
A case in which the plaintiff walked through the plate glass door of his
motel room suggests that previous encounter is not always determinative.'
No tapes marked the clear glass in the sliding door, and the handle and
lock were part of the door frame. The plaintiff had been at the motel "a
day or two" and had used the sliding door during the daytime. On the
night in question, the plaintiff went to get a road map from his car, leaving
the door open. While he was out, his wife shut the door and when he returned the plaintiff walked through the glass. The supreme court held that
the plaintiff could not be charged in law with knowledge of the dangerous condition because he had not had sufficient exposures at night to charge
him with knowledge. The court intimated it would be different if the
plaintiff had closed the door himself and had walked back through it. It
can be inferred from the decision that if the previous encounter is to be
determinative it must have occurred under the same conditions or circumstances as the encounter at the time of the injury.
The court took a similar, limiting view of knowledge of the danger
in a case involving a sixteen-year-old farm employee injured by a defective
tractor.' The tractor was not working properly, and- this was known by
both the plaintiff and the defendant's foreman. The jury found that the
plaintiff did not fully realize and appreciate the nature and extent of the
danger. The supreme court held that the plaintiff was not barred from recovery because he continued to use the tractor with knowledge of the defect. "[K]nowledge of the defect is not enough," said the supreme court.
"[T]here must be knowledge and appreciation of the particular danger in2 Halepekh v. Caflihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.V.2d 363, 373

1 m. 1963).

hill, Assnmed Risk, 20 Sw. L.J. 1 (1966).
a Shortened designation of vokti xom fit ixjsria (he who a
4 371 S.W.2d at 379.
'Greenhill, Assumption of Risk, 28 TExAs B.J. 21, 61 (1961).

4 Scott v. Liebman, 404 S.W.2d 233 (Tem

1966).

'Ellis v. Moore, 401 S.W.2d 799 (Tee. 1966).
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volved so that the plaintiff proceeds to encounter the risk as the result of an
intelligent choice."' The court reiterated its previous observance that assumed risk is a relatively harsh doctrine.which must be kept within "justifiable limits."'
The volenti doctrine was applied, however, to a plaintiff who was an
invitee on the defendant's premises where the defendant's employee was
trying to back a truck onto blocks of wood." While the plaintiff was trying
to push a block in place, the wheels spun, and his hand was caught under
them. The jury found that the plaintiff knew and realized the danger of
attempting to place the blocks and that he assumed the risk of the danger.
It also found that the danger of the truck's moving while the plaintiff was
attempting to place the blocks under the truck wheels was open and obvious. The court of civil appeals affirmed judgment for the plaintiff. 1 It
spoke in terms of "no duty" and stated that the doctrine does not apply
when an activity changes the condition, as it did here when the truck
wheels moved. The supreme court reversed, holding that volenti applied. It
pointed out that the requirements of knowledge and appreciation of the
danger and voluntary exposure were met.
About twenty other assumed risk cases were decided by the courts of
civil appeals, but the supreme court granted writ of error in only one." In
that case, too, controversy centered on whether the plaintiff knew and appreciated the danger which caused his injury. It involved an independent
contractor's employee who was working on the relocation of the defendant
oil company's pipelines. The plaintiff-employee was operating a welding
torch when a dragline punctured a pipeline containing a highly flammable
'hydrocarbon product under pressure.r -The defendant urged. that -he had
warned the plaintiff's employer that the pipelines were "charged" (contained gas under pressure). The court of civil appeals held that this warning
was not sufficient to charge the plaintiff with knowledge and appreciation
of the specific danger.'
' Id. at 793. Similar reasoning was applied in W. R. Grimshaw Co. v. Zoller, 396 S.W.2d
477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e. The plaintiff was leaving defendant's premises at
night and tripped over a roll of wire mesh. The darkness was, of course, an open and obvious
danger, but it was held that he could not be charged with knowledge of the wire mesh.
9 Id. at 792. As an example of the doctrine's harshness, see Gulfway Gen. Hosp. v. Pursley, 397
S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. The plaintiff was entering the hospital for emergency medical treatment. She conceded she knew and appreciated the danger of the hospital's icy
porch but urged that she was justified in proceeding. Held: for defendant. "Plaintiff's exigency

does not impose a duty on defendant." Id. at 94.

"0J. & W. Corp. v. Ball, 10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 170, rehearing denied, 10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 236
(1967).
" J. 8 W. Corp. v. Ball, 404 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error granted.
5
" Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Henry, 403 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error granted.
t3A similar case was Coleman v. Hudson Gas & Oil Corp., 403 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966) error ref. nr.e. Plaintiff was repairing a high pressure gas system when the unit on which
he was working blew out. Plaintiff prevailed on the ground that he did not have knowledge of the
particular danger which caused his injury-the fact that the high pressure line had not been "bled."
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Medical Malpractice. In a case of first impression in Texas, the supreme
court took a new approach to the question of the warning a doctor must
give a patient concerning the risks incident to an operation.".The,,court of
civil appeals held that there was a fact issue for the jury presented on
whether the patient was given information sufficient to enable him to give
an "informed consent" to the operation." Without such consent, said the
civil appeals court, the operation was an assault and battery. The supreme
court, which considered the case twice, brushed aside the assault and battery
theory and characterized the action as "one of malpractice for a physician's
failure to conform to medical standards in obtaining the patient's consent." The court said that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by expert medical testimony that the disclosure made by the doctor was not one
which would be made by a reasonable medical practitioner of the same
school, in the same or a similar community, and under the same or similar
circumstances. The case was remanded for a new trial to determine if the
doctor's disclosures met the medically accepted standard.
The ultimate effect of the decision is difficult to foretell. One view is
that it enlarges the area in which a doctor may be sued for malpractice. On
the other hand, the plaintiff's burden of proof is increased by the change in
labels. One jurist observed, "[I]f negligence must be established, then hard
to come by medical testimony 1must be obtained to sustain it. This is not
true under the trespass theory. W
Another case involving informed consent was decided by a court of civil
appeals. 8 The patient consented to an operation and to use of "any anesthetic." But the patient contended that her consent was ineffective because
(1) the anesthesiologist did not reveal the method by which the-anesthetic
would be administered and (2) the method of administering it caused her
injury. The court disagreed, saying that it would be unreasonable and undesirable to place a burden of full and complete disclosure upon each and
every specialist involved as to the specific methods intended to be used.
Sole Proximate Cause. Texas law on what must be proved and by whom
with respect to sole proximate cause was reviewed in a Fifth Circuit case. '
The plaintiff was the employee of an independent contractor employed to
dismantle an abandoned power line on the defendant's premises. The plaintiff was killed when a pole fell during the work. The defense was that the
conduct of the independent contractor and his employees was the sole proximate cause of the accident that killed the plaintiff. The court reversed the
" Wilson v. Scott, 10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 187 (1967).

"5Scott v. Wilson, 396 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
1 10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 190.
17Bell v. Umstattd, 401 S.W.2d 306, 314 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error dismissed (dissenting
opinion).
"SBell v. Umstattd, 401 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error dismissed.
9
" Eastman Kodak Co. v. Martin, 362 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1966).
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trial court's judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that the lower court
erred in instructing the jury with respect to sole proximate cause. Texas
law, said the appellate court, is that,(1) defendant has the burden of introducing the issue of sole proximate cause and of making out a prima facie
case; (2) the plaintiff then has the burden, as part of his case, to disprove
the facts relied on to show sole proximate cause; and (3) it is not necessary
that the conduct relied on as the sole proximate cause be negligent.
Res Ipsa Loquitur. The fact that a plaintiff attempts and fails to prove
specific acts of negligence does not bar his recovery under the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur. This was the holding in a civil appeals case"0 in which the
defendant's employee was making a delivery of butane gas to a tank located on the plaintiff's premises. While the employee left the truck unattended, gas ecaped and ignited, burning the plaintiff's house. Issues on specific
acts of negligence were answered favorably to the defendant. But the jury
found for the plaintiff on the res ipsa issues. The argument against this
holding might be that res ipsa is a theory that allows an inference of negligence. Thus, if in answer to specific questions the defendant has been acquitted of negligence, the inference cannot be drawn. On the other hand,
it could be said that the jury may have inferred negligence from facts
other than those about which specific inquiries were made.
Automobile Accidents. In the usual flood of litigation involving personal
injuries on the road, the cases reaching the supreme court centered on problems of proper lookout and loss of control.
A defendant may not rely on his loss of control to excuse his own negligence, the supreme court held." The defendant urged that when it proved
the general and unexplained loss of control, the burden was then cast upon
the plaintiff to show the specific negligent act or omission which caused the
loss of control. The supreme court disagreed, stating that the burden was
upon the defendant to go forward with the evidence to prove that the
loss of control was excusable.
Of the numerous cases in this field decided by the lower appellate courts,
the supreme court has granted writ of error in two. One involved loss of
control; 2 2 the other was a rear-end collision.' Both decisions turned on interpretation of the answers to special issues.
Problems of Proof. A recent court of civil appeals holding, though in
2° Smith v. Koenning, 398 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e. For a case in
which a plaintiff failed to come within the exacting requirements for res ipsa loquitur, see Holeman
v. Greyhound Corp., 396 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e. A box from the
defendant's luggage rack fell on plaintiff's head. It was held that res ipsa did not apply inasmuch
as the bus company exercised no control over the passenger's luggage.
2' Hammer v. Dallas Transit Co., 400 S.W.2d 885
(Tex. 1966).
"'Alamo Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Moulton, 402 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error
granted.
23 Jackson v. Ewton, 405 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error granted.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21

line with Texas precedents, seems at variance with common knowledge of
business practice." In a case in which the plaintiff slipped on an onion stalk
in the defendant's grocery, the court withdrew the case from the jury and
rendered judgment for the defendant. The appellate court agreed that the
fact that the onion was "dirty and dark brown with black places on it"
would not justify a conclusion that it was probable the onion had been
on the floor long enough that the defendant should have removed it.' The
implication was that the onion might have been in this condition when it
fell to the floor. However, such an event seems unlikely in view of the
time and effort expended by large, successful supermarkets in keeping their
vegetable displays fresh and alluring.
III.

SPECIAL STATUS OR RELATIONSHIP AFFECTING LIABILITY

CharitableImmunity. The supreme court upheld the Texas rule of charitable immunity in a splintered decision," but the rule's future is shaky at
best. The case involved a slip-and-fall accident in a church. The plaintiff
argued (1) that charitable immunity is outmoded and should be overruled
and (2) that the defendant church had waived its immunity to the extent
of the coverage of a liability insurance policy it had procured. The main
opinion rejected both arguments and reaffirmed the rule that charitable institutions are not liable for the acts or omissions of their servants under the
doctrine of respondeat superior." Nor did the church waive its immunity
by having insurance. The main opinion indicated also a preference for legislative, rather than judicial, action if charitable immunity is to be abandoned. The court said that statutes-are-generally adopted following-a-pxod.
of deliberation accompanied by a sufficient and practical notice to all those
who might be affected. The court noted that the legislature can be more
flexible in selecting the charities and charitable activities to be affected.
Justice Walker concurred but added that he favored announcing now that
the doctrine of charitable immunity will not be recognized in future cases.
Justice Greenhill, also concurring, suggested that the court give notice that
it will feel free to re-examine the doctrine in future cases. He made no
commitment on what he felt the result should be after this re-examination.
Justice Steakley joined with Justice Greenhill. Justice Calvert urged outright judicial abolition of the doctrine, preferably at once. Justice Smith
joined Justice Calvert."s
"Green v. Weingarten, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
2 Ibid.
"Watkins v. Southcrest Baptist Church, 399 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. 1966), 20 Sw. L.J. 163.
2 Southern Methodist Univ. v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W.2d 749 (1943).
"s See generally Keeton, Judicial Reform-A Perspective on i/c Performance of Appellate Cotrts,
44 TEXAs L. REv. 1254, 1258 (1966). For advancements in the field of torts, the author gives
Texas "honorable mention," partly based on the concurring and dissenting opinions in Watkins v.
Southcrest Baptist Church.
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In summation, the box score on charitable immunity would seem to be:
for preserving the doctrine or leaving the question to the legislature, four;
for. abolishing it now or in, the future, three; for .re:examination, two.
In another case a lower court ruled for the defendant under the charitable immunity doctrine but the supreme court refused to grant writ of
error."' The supreme court made it clear, however, in a per curiam statement that the decision rested strictly on procedural grounds.
The court refused to review a decision in which a charitable hospital was
sued for its alleged negligence in supplying a heating pad that burned plaintiff."' Despite the immunity doctrine, the court of civil appeals noted that a
charitable corporation is liable for injuries caused by the corporation's negligence in the exercise of its non-delegable duty to select and supply proper
equipment. Evidence that heating pads were available which would not
burn a patient under any circumstances raised a question of fact as to
whether the hospital was negligent, and the case was remanded for new
trial.
Governmental Immunity. Should charitable immunity fall, speculation
inevitably will turn to the future of governmental immunity. None of the
new decisions, however, suggest immediate peril. Four governmental immunity cases were decided by the courts of civil appeals, and none were
reviewed by the supreme court.
In one case the defendant city was held liable where city waterworks
employees pulled the plaintiff's boathouses out of Lake Waco, breaking
them into pieces.31 The court held that the "maintenance of a waterworks
by a city is a proprietary function," thus falling within the long-recognized
-eXi-aptioh to'governmental immunity- ..
.
.
Governmental immunity barred recovery in a suit against a navigation
district," and in a suit against a city with respect to its garbage collecting
activities.' The doctrine also was applied against a plaintiff who sued in
behalf of a person killed in a collision with an unmarked police car engaged in a high speed chase."
Guest Statute. Negligent entrustment of an automobile may, under some
circumstances, meet the guest statute" requirement of gross negligence.
This would seem to be the meaning of dicta in a short per curiam opinion
9

Tunnell v. Otis Elevator Co., 404 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1966).
'Milner v. Huntsville Memorial Hosp., 398 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error Yef. n.r.e.
a Waco v. Busby, 396 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
asSuch exception to governmental immunity has long been recognized for the operation by a
municipality of a service, such as a waterworks, which could be performed by a private corporation.
See White v. City of San Antonio, 94 Tex. 313, 60 S.W. 426 (1901).
3
" Jones v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 397 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
54
Bean v. City of Monahans, 403 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
55
Mayes v. City of Wichita Falls, 403 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
'"TEx. REV. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701b (1960).
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of the supreme court.' In that case the defendant, owner of an automobile
with a defective steering mechanism, entrusted it to his daughter, an
inexperienced, unlicensed driver. The plaintiff was riding in the car with
the daughter at the time of the accident. The supreme court agreed with the
lower court's holding " that the owner-defendant was not liable to the guest
for ordinary negligence. It noted that the lower court stated that proof of
knowledge by the owner that his automobile had a dangerous defect when
he permitted his daughter to use it did not show gross negligence. But the
supreme court said: "That might be taken to mean that an owner can
never be guilty of gross negligence in the entrustment of a motor vehicle,
and we are not satisfied that this is necessarily so.""
In several other guest statute cases decided in the courts of civil appeals,
the trend was to hold firm against any chipping away of the definition
of a "guest." The oft-repeated standard is that one is a guest unless the
person furnishing the ride expects definite tangible benefit and unless the
securing of the benefit is the motivating influence for furnishing the transportation.'
Infant Plaintiffs. Though an infant plaintiff enjoys a special status in tort
law, the supreme court recognizes that a defendant landowner cannot
possibly foresee all the ways in which youngsters might hurt themselves.41
A five-year-old boy was climbing a fence to cross defendant's back yard
to get to his own home. Next to the fence was a greenhouse with a broken
glass pane. In scrambling over the fence, the boy grabbed the broken pane
and cut off a finger. The supreme court held that the landowner could not
foresee that the boy's injury would be the natural consequence of failure
to repair the broken pane. The court quoted the very quotable passage from
Prosser's Law of Torts, on the impossibility of forestalling all accidents to
children: "There is virtually no condition upon any land with which a
child may not possibly get himself into trouble .... Unless the possessor is
to shoulder the impossible burden of making the land completely 'childproof,' which might mean razing it to the bare earth, something more is
called for than the general possibility of somehow coming to some harm
which follows the child everywhere throughout his daily existence.""
Infant plaintiffs were successful, though, in three court of civil appeals
cases in which the supreme court refused to grant writ of error, no reversible error. One involved two small boys who found signaling devices near
the defendant's railroad tracks and were injured when the devices exploded
7

' Forgus v. Hodnett, 405 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. 1966).
38Forgus v. Hodnett, 401 S.W.2d 104, 105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
39405 S.W.2d at 338. For indication of difficulties of showing that negligent entrustment is
gross negligence, see Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 323,

327, 336

(1963).

"' Dietrich v. F. R. Young Co., 400 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
' McClary v. Jones, 404 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. 1966).
4
"1d. at 315, quoting PROSSER, TORTS § 59 (3d ed. 1964).
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in their hands. 3 In another case a child aged three and one-half was
drowned in a neighbor's swimming pool.' The gate to the fence surrounding the pool did not have a self-closing latch. In the third case, the child
was picnicking in a city park which adjoined a city golf course.' On the
golf course were barrels of liquid fertilizer with spigots which made it
possible for the child to help himself to a fatal dose.
Respondeat Superior. Whether a newspaper's district manager is an independent contractor or an employee may present a close question. In a hardfought case which has been through the appellate courts twice, the relationship, under the particular circumstances shown, was found to be that of
employer-employee, permitting the plaintiff to invoke the doctrine of respondeat superior against the newspaper. The contract between the paper
and the manager designated him as an independent contractor, but evidence
was introduced to show that the paper, nevertheless, exercised a right to
control details of the work."7 The supreme court refused to grant error,
holding no reversible error was present, but it added, per curiam, this caveat: "Our action ... is not to be taken as any disregard for the rule established in this state that the distribution of newspapers to individual purchasers may be accomplished through the medium of independent contractors, provided that such distribution is effected under and consistently with
a contract similar in terms to the one considered in Carter Publications,
Inc. v. Davis .... .,s
The supreme court refused to grant writ of error in two other respondeat
superior cases. A life insurance agent, though engaged in a company training program in which he was closely supervised, was held not to be an
employee. ' But a golf club caddy who drove' a -golf cart-into a-.plaintiff
was found to be an einployee despite the fact that he was paid by the
players, not the club. A somewhat related question, whether an employee
was acting within the scope of his employment, was decided in favor of a
taxicab company whose driver assaulted a passenger.
IV.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

No supreme court cases were decided in this field, but the court gave
qualified approval to four lower court decisions. Paradoxically, the owner
"3Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Covarrubias, 400 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
" Mitchell v. Akers, 401 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
(Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
46Newspapers, Inc. v. Love, 405 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1966).
4 See Newspapers, Inc. v. Love, 397 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
48405 S.W.2d 300, referring to Carter Publications v. Davis, 68 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934) error ref. (Emphasis added.)
"'Allen v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 394 S.W.2d.835 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) error ref. n.r.e.
soRiverbend Country Club v. Patterson, 399 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
" Dart v. Yellow Cab, Inc., 401 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ, App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
4 City of Lampasas v. Roberts, 398 S.W.2d 612
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of a flock of turkeys which failed to thrive on bad turkey feed came out
better than a man who developed cataracts on his eyes as a result of an
abnormal reaction to a drug. The turkey. owner obtained a. judgment of,more than $250,000 upon jury findings that feed was unfit.' It was found
that the feed resulted in death, loss of weight, unfitness for breeding, and
condemnation by government inspectors. A written disclaimer of warranty
by the feed company was held to be of no effect because of the strict liability that the law imposes.
In the drug case the plaintiff sought recovery on both negligence and
implied warranty." He lost on both counts because special issues predicated on foreseeability of harm by the defendant were answered unfavorably to the plaintiff. The court cited Jacob E. Decker & Son& v. Capps"
which imposed liability on a non-negligent food manufacturer and expressed "no doubt" that the same rule applies to "drugs such as MER-29. ' ' u
But the court said the liability of the manufacturer is not that of an insurer
and does not extend to persons injured as the result of an "abreaction,"
i.e., an unusual susceptibility which could not have been reasonably foreseen in an appreciable class or number of potential users.
Ordinarily, the question of proximate cause (with its element of foreseeability) is one that is asked only after it has been established that the
defendant was guilty of a negligent act or omission. It might be asked
whether, in product liability cases not requiring proof of negligence, the
plaintiff should be required to prove proximate cause or only producing
cause (causation in fact). On the other hand, it might be argued that legal
theories are beside the point inasmuch as the law of products liability has
developed on broad grounds of social policy. In that'context-;-the question"
might be: should protection of the public through strict liability be carried
to such an extent that development of new drugs will be discouraged? Such
beneficial drugs as penicillin produce harmful effects in a small number
of users.

In the third case, a plaintiff who claimed damages as the result of a defective fire extinguisher, did not recover." The plaintiff's suit was based
on implied warranty, but since it was against the manufacturer the plaintiff
could not show privity of contract. The court said that the rule of Decker,
which does not require privity, applies only to food cases.
The privity requirement was circumvented, however, by a plaintiff who
based his suit, not on implied warranty, but on negligence." The plaintiff
"McMillen

Feeds, Inc. v. Harlow, 405 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
"Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
4139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
'5 398 S.W.2d at 644.
"Cruz v. Ansul Chem. Co., 399 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
57 Starr v. Koppers Co., 398 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. #.r.e.
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contended that the manufacturer and distributor of the "bitumastic-type"
product were negligent in failing to warn him of the product's harmful
effects. 8 The court of civil appeals said, "Whatever may be the present
embattled status of the privity doctrine in cases based on so-called implied
warranty ... the courts have excised the privity requirement from the law
of negligence."'
V. INJURIES BY PUBLICATION

The rule, cherished by Texas newspapers, that substantial truth will
shield them from a libel suit was reiterated in a court of civil appeals
case."0 The defendant newspaper published a story which stated that the
plaintiff and Hunter "were arrested in connection with an extensive burglary operation .... An estimated $25,000 worth of stolen items have been
recovered by Amarillo police." 1 The defendant claimed the privilege
afforded by article 5432 to publish "a fair, true and impartial account of
the proceedings in a court of justice . . . ." The plaintiff contended the
account was untrue by implication since, in fact, a large portion of the
stolen property was recovered from Hunter rather than from the plaintiff.
The court held that the paper was entitled to the protection of the statute.
When the story is substantially true, it does not have to be literally true.
VI. NUISANCE
A firm operating a chain of fried chicken restaurants built a rendering
plant near the plaintiff's property. 3 Feathers and other waste products from
the' chicken pro&ssihg' were burned at the' plant.-The defendarit's pofititon'
was that action was barred by limitation. It contended that since the plant
was permanent, limitations began to run when it was erected in 1962.
Plaintiffs urged that the nuisance was temporary in that they were only
" Though not decided last year, an interesting and complex products liability case brought by
an automobile purchaser was argued before the supreme court last year. The decision had not been
handed down at the time of this writing.
The case is Ford Motor Co. v. Puskar, 394 S.W.2d I (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error granted. The
plaintiff bought a 1959 Thunderbird with power steering and power brakes. He was involved in
an accident when the engine died and he was unable to control the car with only manual steering
and brakes. He testified that he told the dealer the engine died on full application of the brakes
and that the dealer told him to wait and get this fixed in the 1,000-mile check-up.
The court of civil appeals found the dealer liable for negligent refusal to repair. But it held
there was no evidence to support jury findings that the manufacturer's manual made false representations to the buyer that the car could be safely steered and controlled when the engine was
stopped.
39 398 S.W.2d at 830.
"0 Walker v. Globe-News Publishing Co., 395 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) error ref. n.r.e.
6' Id. at 687.
e'TEx. Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5432 (1958).
"3Youngblood's, Inc. v. Goebel, 404 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. For
further discussion see Larsen, Property, this Survey at footnote 26.
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affected when prevailing winds carried noxious odors to their property in
1963 and 1965. The plaintiffs prevailed. The court agreed that the nuisance
was temporary and that the cause of action accrued when the plaintiffs first
sustained injury.
VII. MISREPRESENTATION

A defendant who induces a plaintiff through misrepresentation to enter
into a contract cannot defend on the ground that the defendant was unduly gullible." An agent of the defendant insurance company represented
to the plaintiff that it was offering him new policies at no cost to him. What
the plaintiff actually received were four new policies with the first one and
one-half annual premiums paid by a loan on his old paid-up policies. Addi-

tional premiums were due on the new policies. In affirming judgment for
the plaintiff, the court of civil appeals said, "[A] fraud-feasor cannot excuse his fraudulent acts by asserting that the defrauded person was unduly
credulous and guilty of contributory negligence in believing the fraudulent
statements made to him."'

'Southern States Life Ins. Co. v. Newlon, 398 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref.
n.r.e.
65 Id. at 626.

